United States District Court, D. Nebraska
KELYNN O.J. THOMPSON, Petitioner,
BRAD JOHNSON, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD G. KOPF, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before me on initial review of Petitioner Kelynn
O.J. Thompson's (“Thompson”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Filing No. 1.) For the reasons
discussed below, I will dismiss Thompson's petition
petition filed on April 11, 2019, Thompson challenged the
post-release supervision proceedings pending against him in
the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, at No.
CR18-286. As best the court can ascertain, Thompson alleges
that his revocation proceedings are based on conduct that is
also the subject of new pending criminal charges and
Thompson's situation is similar to that of another
individual, Eric Robinson (“Robinson”), whose
post-release supervision revocation proceedings were dropped
by the State. Liberally construed, Thompson claims he has
been denied equal protection of the law because his
post-release revocation proceedings should be dismissed just
as Robinson's were dismissed.
to Thompson's state court records, available to this
court online, the State of Nebraska withdrew its motion to
revoke Thompson's post-release supervision on September
9, 2019. I take judicial notice of the state district court
records related to this case in State v. Thompson,
No. CR18-286, District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska.
See Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757,
760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (court may take judicial notice of
judicial opinions and public records); Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 (providing for judicial notice of adjudicative
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual, ongoing
cases and controversies.” Haden v. Pelofsky,
212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir.2000); see U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “When, during the course of
litigation, the issues presented in a case ‘lose their
life because of the passage of time or a change in
circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant
effective relief,' the case is considered moot.”
Id. (quoting Beck v. Mo. State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir.1994)
(alteration in original)); see also Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43
(1998) (stating an action becomes moot where it “no
longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article
III”). If an issue is moot in the Article III sense, we
have no discretion and must dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction. See Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723-24 (8th Cir.
Thompson is no longer subject to post-release supervision
revocation proceedings, I conclude this case is moot and must
because “the detention complained of arises from
process issued by a state court, ” Thompson must obtain
a certificate of appealability. See28 U.S.C. §
2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); see also Hoffler
v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting
cases of courts that ruled a state prisoner who petitions for
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must obtain a
certificate of appealability). The standards for certificates
(1) where the district court reaches the merits or (2) where
the district court rules on procedural grounds are set forth
in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). I
have applied the appropriate standard and determined that
Thompson is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
THEREFORE ORDERED that:
petition for writ of habeas corpus (filing no. 1) is
dismissed without prejudice. No. certificate of appealability
has been or will be issued.
court will enter judgment by separate document.