United States District Court, D. Nebraska
Smith Camp, Senior United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment, ECF No. 17. For the reasons stated below,
the Motion will be granted.
following facts are those alleged in the Complaint, ECF No.
1, and are unchallenged by the Defendant.
through Rural Housing Service (RHS), an agency of USDA,
Plaintiff made a Rural Housing Loan to Defendant Tamra L.
Baxter on or about November 29, 2001.
signed a promissory note and promised to pay to RHS the sum
of $95, 000.00 with interest at the rate of 6.875 percent. In
consideration for this loan, Baxter granted to RHS a
purchase-money security interest in the form of a Real Estate
Trust Deed covering the following property:
Lot Five (5) in Highview Addition to Springfield, an
Addition to the City of Springfield, as surveyed, platted,
and recorded in Sarpy County, Nebraska
ECF No. 18-1, Page ID 49-50. The Trust Deed was recorded in
the Office of Register of Deeds of Sarpy County, Nebraska, on
December 4, 2001.
May 14, 2019, RHS claims it is owed, pursuant to the
provisions of the liability and security instruments
described above, a total balance of $166, 702.65 plus costs
and interest. The total sum includes $96, 645.74 in total
principal and $26, 002.39 in total interest as of May 14,
2019. RHS also claims it is owed interest accruing thereafter
at the daily rate of $18.1912 per day to the date of judgment
in this case together with interest at the legal rate
thereafter; $44, 054.52 in interest credit or subsidy subject
to recapture; and the costs of this action.
interests of the Defendant are junior and inferior to the
interests of the Plaintiff.
February 14, 2019, the Court granted the Plaintiff's
request for service by publication on Defendant. The
Plaintiff published notice of this action, as required by the
Court's order. ECF No. 13. To date, Defendant had not
answered or otherwise appeared. On May 13, 2019, the Clerk of
Court entered default against Defendant. ECF No. 16.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commit the entry of a
default judgment against a party to the sound discretion of
the trial court.” Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
Davis, 786 F.3d 653, 661 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting FTC v.
Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir. 1977))
(per curiam). It is “appropriate for a district court
to enter a default judgment when a party fails to
appropriately respond in a timely manner.” Marshall
v. Baggett, 616 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Inman v. Am. Home Furniture Placement, Inc., 120
F.3d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1997)). “Upon default, the
factual allegations of a complaint (except those relating to
the amount of damages) are taken as true, but ‘it
remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged
facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a ...