Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A
jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion
independent of the lower court's decision.
Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, an
appellate court must determine whether it has jurisdiction.
Courts: Jurisdiction. While it is not a
constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction, the existence
of an actual case or controversy is necessary for the
exercise of judicial power.
Actions: Moot Question. An action becomes
moot when the issues initially presented in the proceedings
no longer exist or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome of the action.
Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A moot
case is one which seeks to determine a question that no
longer rests upon existing facts or rights-i.e., a case in
which the issues presented are no longer alive.
Moot Question. Mootness refers to events
occurring after the filing of a suit which eradicate the
requisite personal interest in the resolution of the dispute
that existed at the beginning of the litigation.
Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and
Error. Although mootness does not prevent appellate
jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that can
prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction.
Moot Question. As a general rule, a moot
case is subject to summary dismissal.
Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Generally,
once an appeal is perfected, the trial court no longer has
jurisdiction until a mandate issues.
Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Visitation: Appeal and
Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2)
(Reissue 2016), a trial court may retain [302 Neb. 721]
jurisdiction to provide for an order concerning custody and
parenting time even while an appeal of one of its orders is
Jurisdiction: Minors: Final Orders: Appeal and
Error. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue
2016) does not grant a trial court authority to hear and
determine anew the very issues then pending on appeal and to
enter permanent orders addressing these issues during the
from the District Court for Lancaster County: Kevin R.
McManaman, Judge. Vacated and dismissed.
A. Rasmussen, of Mattson Ricketts Law Firm, for appellant.
P. Kyker and Bradley A. Sipp for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik,
and Freudenberg, JJ.
Becher and Mark A. Becher were divorced by decree in 2015.
The parenting plan ordered by the court established a
parenting time schedule for only one of the parties'
three children. In 2018, while an appeal from the dissolution
decree was pending in this court, Mark filed a motion seeking
to establish parenting time and telephone communication with
one of the other children. The court granted that motion, and
Sonia appeals. For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate
and Mark were married in December 1991 and had three
children: Daniel Becher, born in 2000; Cristina Becher, born
in 2002; and Susana Becher, born in 2008. Sonia and Mark were
divorced in 2015 after an exceptionally contentious
appealed, and Sonia cross-appealed the 2015 dissolution
decree. Both parties, in part, assigned the district court
[302 Neb. 722] erred in its ordering of the custodial
arrangement and the award of parenting time. The court's
decree ordered what it described as a "split and
joint" custody arrangement. We described the arrangement
in Becher v. Becher (Becher I):
The district court found that a split and joint custody
arrangement with [a] parenting plan designed to reduce
potential conflicts was in the best interests of the
children. In its decree, the court ordered that Sonia have
permanent legal and physical care, custody, and control of
the parties' two daughters, while Mark have permanent
legal and physical care, custody, and control of the
parties' son with each "subject to the rights of
parenting time for the noncustodial parent as set forth in
the parenting plan." However, the court-ordered
parenting plan provided that the parties would share joint
legal custody of all three children, with Mark having primary
physical custody of the parties' son, Sonia having
primary physical custody of the parties' oldest daughter,
and shared joint physical custody of the parties'
youngest daughter. . . . [T]he court-ordered parenting ...