Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

February 1, 2019

QUINTON HARRIS, GEOFFREY MILLER, NORMAN MOUNT, SCOTT ZINN, THOMAS TAYLOR, and JOHN BAKER, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          JOSEPH F. BATAILLON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' objection, Filing No. 253, to the magistrate judge's order, Filing No. 238, granting defendant's motion for a protective order, Filing No. 214; the motion to exclude the expert opinion of Dr. Kevin Trangle, Filing No. 262, filed by Union Pacific; the motion to strike the expert report of Dr. John Holland, filed by plaintiffs, Filing No. 270; the motion to exclude the testimony of expert Paul Dillard, filed by Union Pacific, Filing No. 275; the motion to exclude testimony by expert Michael Collins, Filed by Union Pacific, Filing No. 278; and the motion to exclude or strike the expert report of Dr. Ali Saad, filed by plaintiffs, Filing No. 282.

         This case is a putative class action suit and involves claims of employment disability discrimination under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b). Filing No. 20, Amended Complaint.[1]

         On review of a decision of the magistrate judge on a pretrial matter, the district court may set aside any part of the magistrate judge's order that it finds is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1986). See also Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting “a magistrate is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive discovery disputes”). The Court finds that the magistrate judge's findings are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

         I. Background

         Union Pacific has a company-wide Fitness-for-Duty (“FFD”) program. SeeFiling No. 20, Ex. A. In 2014, Union Pacific made changes to this program. Employees in certain positions under the new policy are required to disclose specific health conditions, and the newly implemented policy automatically excluded employees who disclosed these conditions from employment. These employees then had to have a fitness for duty evaluation, and according to plaintiffs, Union Pacific routinely ignores the medical opinions of outside doctors. The records are sent to Dr. John Holland in Olympia, Washington. Dr. Holland does not do a physical evaluation, but he and his designees make all decisions regarding who is fit for duty.

         Plaintiffs are all previous employees of Union Pacific. Many had worked for years, were qualified and performing their jobs with no problems. They were pulled from their jobs under their new program, evaluated, and then excluded from their positions at Union Pacific, even though they had no trouble fulfilling the essential functions of their jobs.

         II. Discussion

         A. Objection to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

         The New Policy[2] requires that an employee must disclose certain conditions to Union Pacific. Thereafter, the employee must obtain an FFD examination. Further, the employee must (1) stay off work until the evaluation has been conducted and the employee deemed fit for work; (2) notify his or her supervisor that the employee has a reportable health event and cannot work; and (3) notify health and medical services that the employee must complete an FFD evaluation. Further, under the medical rules, FFD evaluations are also automatic for an employee who transfers “from an existing Union Pacific job assignment to a different job assignment outside of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement . . . [t]o a Dispatcher position or an Operating Department field position (including all Transportation, Engineering Services, and Mechanical position - agreement and nonagreement), and/or (b) [t]o a position requiring regulatory certification, and/or (c) [t]o other selected positions, where it is determined that a Job Transfer Evaluation is needed, based on physical and functional requirements of the job”. Filing No. 20, ¶ 5. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Holland routinely finds employees not fit for work and routinely finds that their medications keep them from returning to their positions at Union Pacific. Each of the plaintiffs tell a story of this type that took them out of service and away from their jobs, generally because of these “Sudden Incapacitation Restrictions.” Id. at ¶ 16. They were disqualified from employment despite that in most cases, their treating physicians cleared them for work.

         Defendant Union Pacific moved for a protective order shielding it from plaintiffs' interrogatories Nos. 23 and 24[3] and from all future inquires regard Union Pacific's color vision testing. Plaintiffs contested this motion, arguing the color vision testing information they requested is relevant to their disability claims in this case. The magistrate judge determined that the color vision testing information is not relevant and granted Union Pacific's motion for a protective order.

         Plaintiffs point out that they bring this action on behalf of a class of individuals. The class includes:

[ADA Class:] Individuals who were removed from service over their objection, and/or suffered another adverse employment action, during their employment with Union Pacific for reasons related to a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation at any time from 300 days before the earliest date that a named Plaintiff filed an administrative charge of discrimination to the resolution of this action.

Filing No. 20, First Am. Compl. ¶ 116. In that regard, Union Pacific implemented a new color vision field test known as CVFT “Light Cannon” test. Filing No. 215 at 5; Filing No. 229-4, Ex. 3, Lewis Dep. 86:11-87:14. In April 2016, Defendant replaced its color vision field test (“CVFT”) with a new CVFT, the “Light Cannon” test. The old CVFT used existing train signals in the field, while the new Light Cannon test uses a mobile light cannon device that Union Pacific developed in-house. Dr. Lewis-the AMD responsible for making FFD determinations relating to color vision-testified that “the majority fail” the new Light Cannon test. Filing No. 229-4, Ex. 3, Lewis Dep. 92:4-14. He further testified that the passage rate “was probably much higher with the old field test than it is now.” Id. at 93:7-20. Dr. Lewis has also seen a number of employees who passed the old test and failed the new one. Id. Plaintiffs contend that persons with purported color vision deficiencies are unquestionably part of this case. Paragraph 116 of the Amended Complaint specifically includes all adverse employment actions “related to a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation. Filing No. 20. Dr. Lewis testified that cases where employees fail a color vision exam are part of Defendant's FFD program and that Union Pacific employees have suffered adverse employment actions when they failed this test. Filing No. 229-4, Ex. 3, Lewis Dep. 27:11-17.[4]

         Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Jay Neitz, filed a rebuttal to the expert of Union Pacific, Dr. Holland. Dr. Neitz discusses the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA's) color vision requirements for conductors and engineers. Filing No. 217, at 2-3. He further considers the cases of seven employees who were removed by Union Pacific from their jobs. He states that “[t]here is no rigorous scientific study published in a peer-reviewed scientific or medical publication that demonstrates the CV Light Cannon is valid, reliable and a comparable test for visual capacity” as required by the FRA. Filing No. 217 at 11.

         The Court agrees with the plaintiffs. Under Rule 26, a party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id.To justify a protective order limiting the broad reach of discovery, the moving party is required to make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotype and conclusory statements, ” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16 (1981), that the discovery sought subjects the moving party to “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). The Court may issue a protective order only for good cause. Id. A party seeking a protective order must show that a “clearly defined and serious injury” would result if the discovery was conducted, Constand v. Cosby, 229 F.R.D. 472, 479 (E.D. Penn. 2005), and “[s]uch [a] determination must also include a consideration of the relative hardship to the non-moving party should the protective order be granted.” Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973).

         Defendant is not entitled to a protective order. We are at the discovery phase of this lawsuit. Following discovery, if the evidence points otherwise, Union Pacific is free to file another motion. But at this point, Union Pacific must answer Interrogatories numbered 23 and 24 and disclose the requested information. Union Pacific cannot show good cause; it has not shown hardship; and its argument that this is without relevance is incorrect. The allegations made by the plaintiffs clearly encompass vision testing as it is included in the FFD program. The representation in this case is for all who suffered adverse employment actions related to Union Pacific's FFD program. The criteria have been applied to the vision testing and utilized by Dr. Holland on behalf of Union Pacific. Further, for all these reasons, Dr. Neitz's rebuttal report is relevant and will not be excluded.[5]

         B. Law - Motions in Limine

         The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the principles laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). The district court's “gatekeeping obligation” applies to all types of expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and requires that: A(1) the evidence must be based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that is useful to the finder of fact in deciding the ultimate issue of fact; (2) the witness must have sufficient expertise to assist the trier of fact; and (3) the evidence must be reliable or trustworthy.@ Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2003). Expert testimony assists the trier of fact when it provides information beyond the common knowledge of the trier of fact. Id. at 860.

         When faced with a proffer of expert testimony, trial judges are charged with the "gatekeeping" responsibility of ensuring that all expert evidence admitted is both relevant and reliable. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2006). A trial court must be given wide latitude in determining whether an expert's testimony is reliable. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. This analysis requires that the court make a Apreliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology . . . can be [properly] applied to the facts in issue.@ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.

         The court may consider several factors in determining the soundness of the scientific methodology including: (1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique; and (4) whether the theory or technique used has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-594. Courts must focus on the principles and methodology rather than the conclusion they generate. Id. at 595.

         [N]othing in Rule 702, Daubert, or its progeny requires 'that an expert resolve an ultimate issue of fact to a scientific absolute in order to be admissible.'" Kudabeck, 338 F.3d at 861 (quoting Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001)). Rather, the proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of providing admissibility beyond a preponderance of the evidence. Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001). When the application of a scientific methodology is challenged as unreliable under Daubert and the methodology itself is otherwise sufficiently reliable, outright exclusion of the evidence is Awarranted only if the methodology was so altered by a deficient application as to skew the methodology itself.@ United States v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 697 (8th Cir. 2004) (brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993)).

         “As a general rule, the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination.” Hartley v. Dillard's, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Bonner v. ISP Tech., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001)). However, it also is true that if the expert's opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury, it must be excluded. Id.An expert opinion that fails to consider the relevant facts of the case is fundamentally unsupported. Id.

         The objective of the Daubert inquiry is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc., 783 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2015). This is a flexible, case-specific inquiry: the Court must decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in the case. Id. at 723.

         Daubert established a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the reliability of expert testimony, including whether the theory or technique can and has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review, whether there is a high known or potential rate of error, and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. See United States v. Holmes, 751 F.3d 846, 850 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94).

         1. Expert opinion of Dr. Trangle

         Union Pacific moves to exclude portions of expert opinions of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Trangle, Filing No. 262. Union Pacific contends that the proffered testimony of Dr. Tangle goes beyond the specifics of the 12 people he reviewed in his expert report. Further, Union Pacific argues Dr. Trangle is not qualified to offer a statistics-based conclusion, and in any event, the 12 individuals cannot provide a representative sample for the rest of the putative class that plaintiffs want to certify. Union Pacific argues the opinions do not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 702 and Daubert.

         In response, plaintiff argues that Dr. Trangle is qualified as he is a board-certified occupational medicine doctor. Plaintiff further argues that his testimony is reliable. He is a medical doctor who is regularly involved with FFD determinations both from an individual and a policy perspective. For his opinion he reviewed Union Pacific's memos, policies, procedures, guidelines, appendixes, other documentation, and the individuals that he reviewed. He testified that the only statistics he opined in were in the medical literature he reviewed. Filing No. 263-A1, Trangle Dep. (5-16-18) 95:20-96:4. The data confirms that over 7, 000 Union Pacific employees have been subjected to a FFD evaluation due to a “reportable health event” during the applicable statutory period, from September 18, 2014 to the present. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5 & Filing No. 248, Schug Decl.; see also Filing No. 248-29, Defendant's Fourth Set of Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production to Defendant, Set I). According to plaintiff the data shows:

• The available data reveal that at least 3, 145 of the workers were designated as not cleared to work or were issued work restrictions as a result of their fitness-for-duty determinations.
**For workers identified in Union Pacific's records as having a “critical diagnosis, ” the data reveals that they were not cleared to work or were given work ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.