United States District Court, D. Nebraska
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Richard G. Kopf, Senior United States District Judge.
Plaintiff,
James Cotton, currently an inmate at the Tecumseh State
Correctional Center, filed his pro se Complaint (Filing 1) on
October 4, 2018. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on October 9, 2018 (Filing 6), and paid an
initial partial filing fee on November 2, 2018. The court now
conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff
alleges that on October 24, 2016, while being held at the
Douglas County Correction Center (“DCCC”), he
became involved in an altercation with a cellmate in the
max-1 protective custody unit, as a result of which a female
corrections officer handcuffed Plaintiff and seated him in a
chair. Several minutes later, two male corrections officers,
Defendants Stevens and Estevez, “came into the unit and
began talking loudly to Plaintiff as they yanked him out of
his chair.” (Filing 1, p. 8). “Plaintiff advised
both [men] that due to his disability that he needed his
medically issued wheelchair.” (Filing 1, pp. 8-9). They
“ignore[d] plaintiff and stated ‘well your
[sic] walking today Motherfucker.' Both the
female c.o. and unit c.o. (names unknown) also advised
defendants Stevens and Estevez that Plaintiff needed a
wheelchair for transport. [T]he defendants abusively grabbed
plaintiff and began running with Plaintiff leaving the max-1
unit into the hallway. Stevens was verbally abusing plaintiff
and Estevez advised plaintiff, ‘since you like suing
people, you can sue us too'. Plaintiff's legs gave
out from underneath him. The defendants then slammed
Plaintiff head first into the concrete floor knocking him
unconscious.... Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary, where
they glued his eyebrow shut to stop the bleeding, ....”
(Filing 1, p. 9). Plaintiff alleges he “sustained a
concussion, black eyes, head trauma (severe) swollen rib
Intercostal torn and severe bruising.” (Filing 1, p.
8).
Four
claims are alleged by Plaintiff: (1) an Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Stevens and Estevez, in their
individual capacities (“Count Four”); (2) an
Eighth Amendment claim against Douglas County for failing to
train and supervise Stevens and Estevez (“Count
One”); (3) an Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) claim against DCCC based on the refusal
of Stevens and Estevez to transport Plaintiff in a wheelchair
(“Count Two”); and (4) a Rehabilitation Act claim
against DCCC, also based on such refusal by the officers
(“Count Three”). (Filing 1, pp. 5-7).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The
court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis
complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an
officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. The court must dismiss
a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or
malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se
plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The
essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a
general indication of the type of litigation
involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir.
1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be
liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a
lesser pleading standard than other parties.”
Id., at 849 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
A.
Excessive Force Claims
Although
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the
allegations of the Complaint do not reveal whether Plaintiff
was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time
of the alleged incident. The Eighth Amendment “has no
application” until there has been a “formal
adjudication of guilt.” Walton v. Dawson, 752
F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Revere
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). But the
Fourteenth Amendment gives state pretrial detainees rights
which are “at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner.” Id. (emphasis in original; quoting
City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244). The Constitution
affords greater protection to a pretrial detainee compared to
a convicted inmate in the sense that “[d]ue process
requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.”
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 n. 16 (1979)).
Excessive
force claims of pretrial detainees are analyzed under an
objective reasonableness standard. Ryan v.
Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 2017). A court
must assess the actions of each officer “from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including
what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.” Id. (quoting Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)). A court must
also account for the “legitimate interests that stem
from [the government's] need to manage the facility in
which the individual is detained, ” appropriately
deferring to “policies and practices that in th[e]
judgment” of jail officials “are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.” Id. (quoting
Bell, 441 U.S. at 520). Factors relevant to
assessing the objective reasonableness of force used by
officers include:
the relationship between the need for the use of force and
the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit
the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id. (quoting Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473).
“After
incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866
F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). “[W]henever
prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical
force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in
Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Id. (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)). This
inquiry turns on “such factors as the need for the
application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury
inflicted, ” from which “inferences may be drawn
as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been
thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with
respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is
tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.”
Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). The
word “sadistically” is not surplusage;
“‘maliciously' and ‘sadistically'
have different meanings, and the two together establish a
higher level of intent than would either alone.”
Id. (quoting Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d
868, 872 (8th Cir. 1994)). “One acts
‘maliciously' by undertaking, without just cause or
reason, a course of action intended to injure another; in
contrast, one acts ‘sadistically' by engaging in
extreme or excessive cruelty or by delighting in
cruelty.” United States v. Miller, 477 F.3d
644, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Howard v. Barnett,
21 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.1994)).
1.
Defendants Stevens and Estevez
In
Count Four of his Complaint, [1] Plaintiff alleges:
Defendants Stevens and Estevez ignored plaintiff's
request to be provided a “wheelchair”, for
transport, due to his disability on October 24, 2016, when
escorting plaintiff out of protective custody unit max-1 at
the DCCC. Instead the defendants used excessive [force]
against Plaintiff that was unnecessary, maliciously and
...