Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Valentine v. Doe

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

March 26, 2018

VERONICA VALENTINE, Plaintiff,
v.
ONE JOHN DOE “CI, ” OFFICER BROWN, OFFICER BIVENS, and JOHN DOE POLICE Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff filed her pro se Complaint on February 16, 2018 (Filing No. 1), and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis that same date (Filing No. 5). The court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

         I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

         Plaintiff states in the Complaint that she is “seeking damages from the ‘CI' police claimed in application for search warrant” and demands that the identity of the confidential informant be made known. She generally alleges that the CI and police acted in concert to violate her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

         II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

         The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

         Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

         “The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

         III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIM

         Plaintiff indicates this is a “Ku Klux Klan Act 1873 Civil Action” (Filing No. 1), which, based on the conclusory allegations of the Complaint, the court construes to be an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

         Plaintiff's Complaint contains no facts to show that Defendants violated her constitutional rights, or that Defendants acted under color of state law. Officers Brown and Biven are not adequately identified.[1] They are sued both in their individual and official capacities, but no facts are alleged to show that a municipal “policy” or “custom” played a part in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.[2]Whether the “CI, ” who presumably is a private actor, can be sued as a co-conspirator under § 1983 need not be decided at this time because no facts are alleged to show the existence of a conspiracy. See Gibson v. Cook, 764 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must establish “not only that a private actor caused a deprivation of constitutional rights, but that the private actor willfully participated with state officials and reached a mutual understanding concerning the unlawful objective of a conspiracy.”) (quoting Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 951 (8th Cir.2005)); Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010) (to allege state action in § 1983 conspiracy claim against private actors, complaint must allege specific facts showing a meeting of the minds between state actor and private actors).

         IV. CONCLUSION

         Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On its own motion, however, the court ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.