United States District Court, D. Nebraska
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge.
filed her pro se Complaint on February 16, 2018 (Filing No.
1), and was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis that same date (Filing No. 5). The court
now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
states in the Complaint that she is “seeking damages
from the ‘CI' police claimed in application for
search warrant” and demands that the identity of the
confidential informant be made known. She generally alleges
that the CI and police acted in concert to violate her
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss
a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or
malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to
“nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a
general indication of the type of litigation
involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir.
1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be
liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a
lesser pleading standard than other parties.”
Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
DISCUSSION OF CLAIM
indicates this is a “Ku Klux Klan Act 1873 Civil
Action” (Filing No. 1), which, based on the
conclusory allegations of the Complaint, the court construes
to be an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Complaint contains no facts to show that Defendants violated
her constitutional rights, or that Defendants acted under
color of state law. Officers Brown and Biven are not
adequately identified. They are sued both in their individual and
official capacities, but no facts are alleged to show that a
municipal “policy” or “custom” played
a part in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.Whether the “CI, ” who
presumably is a private actor, can be sued as a
co-conspirator under § 1983 need not be decided
at this time because no facts are alleged to show the
existence of a conspiracy. See Gibson v. Cook, 764
F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must establish
“not only that a private actor caused a deprivation of
constitutional rights, but that the private actor willfully
participated with state officials and reached a mutual
understanding concerning the unlawful objective of a
conspiracy.”) (quoting Dossett v. First State
Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 951 (8th Cir.2005)); Murray v.
Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010) (to allege state
action in § 1983 conspiracy claim against
private actors, complaint must allege specific facts showing
a meeting of the minds between state actor and private
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. On its own motion, however, the court ...