United States District Court, D. Nebraska
JESSE A. FRANK, Plaintiff,
DOUGLAS COUNTY and CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge
September 11, 2017, the court entered a Memorandum and Order
giving Plaintiff, who has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, “30 days in which to file an amended
complaint that states a claim on which relief may be granted
against Defendants Douglas County and Correct Care
Solutions” (Filing No. 18).Plaintiff's pro se
Amended Complaint (Filing No. 21) was filed on October 11,
2017.The court now conducts an initial review of
the Amended Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal
is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2).
SUMMARY OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
asserts multiple claims pertaining to a 33-day period during
which he was confined in the Douglas County jail as a
pretrial detainee. Plaintiff alleges he (1) was denied
medical treatment; (2) was not read his Miranda
rights; (3) was wrongly placed in administrative confinement
and was mistreated; (4) was attacked by three officers; (5)
was denied access to the courts; and (6) was denied access to
a Bible and newspaper. Plaintiff seeks to recover $51 billion
in damages. In addition to Douglas County and Correct Care
Solutions, Plaintiff names five officers as Defendants:
Estevez, Grahm, Rose, Parks, and Grothe.
LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss
a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or
malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to
“nudge their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a
general indication of the type of litigation
involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir.
1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be
liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a
lesser pleading standard than other parties.”
Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
indicates this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which provides a cause of action for “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.
Plaintiff claims to have been deprived of his rights under
the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Claims Against Douglas County
was advised in the court's August 28th Memorandum and
Order that Douglas County may only be liable under
section 1983 if a “policy” or
“custom” of the county caused a violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. Doe, 150 F.3d
at 922 (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The court also instructed
Plaintiff what he needed to plead and prove in this regard.
Plaintiff has not included any factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint to establish the existence of a policy or
custom, Douglas County will be dismissed from the action. Any
and all claims alleged against county officers in their
official capacities will also be dismissed. See Parrish
v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Suits against persons in their official capacity are
just another method of filing suit against the
entity.”); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 629
n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (“‘[A]n official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a
suit against the entity.”' (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
Claims Against ...