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Stewart v. Heineman

Supreme Court of Nebraska

April 7, 2017

Greg Stewart et al., appellees,
v.
Dave Heineman, in his official capacity as Governor of Nebraska, et al., appellants.

         1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

         2. Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. When attorney fees are authorized, the trial court exercises its discretion in setting the amount of the fee, which ruling an appellate court will not disturb on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.

         3. Summary Judgment. In the summary judgment context, a fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case.

         4. Justiciable Issues. A justiciable issue requires a present, substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests susceptible to immediate resolution and capable of present judicial enforcement.

         5. Courts: Justiciable Issues. A court decides real controversies and determines rights actually controverted, and does not address or dispose of abstract questions or issues that might arise in a hypothetical or fictitious situation or setting.

         6. Justiciable Issues: Standing. Standing is a key function in determining whether a justiciable controversy exists.

         7. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on the litigant's behalf.

         8. Actions: Justiciable Issues: Standing. The ripeness doctrine is rooted in the same general policies of justiciability as standing and mootness. As compared to standing, ripeness assumes that an asserted injury is [296 Neb. 263] sufficient to support standing, but asks whether the injury is too contingent or remote to support present adjudication.

         9. Actions: Jurisdiction. An appellate court uses a two-part inquiry to determine ripeness: (1) the jurisdictional question of the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the prudential question concerning the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.

         10. Declaratory Judgments. The function of a declaratory judgment is to determine justiciable controversies which either are not yet ripe for adjudication by conventional forms of remedy or, for other reasons, are not conveniently amenable to the usual remedies.

         11. Equal Protection: Discrimination. The injury in an equal protection case is the imposition of a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit, rather than the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.

         12. Discrimination. When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need only demonstrate that he or she is ready and able to perform and that a discriminatory policy prevents him or her from doing so on an equal basis.

         13. Discrimination: Standing. For those persons who are personally subject to discriminatory treatment, stigmatizing injury caused by discrimination is a serious noneconomic injury that is sufficient to support standing.

         14. Standing. Standing does not require exercises in futility.

         15. Actions: Moot Question. An action becomes moot when the issues initially presented in the proceedings no longer exist or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the action.

         16. Discrimination: Declaratory Judgments: Injunction: Proof. If a discriminatory policy is openly declared, then it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate it is followed in order to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief.

         17. Actions: Moot Question. A defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued.

         18. Actions: Moot Question: Proof. A defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.

         19. Appeal and Error. A court's consideration of a cause on appeal is limited to errors assigned and discussed.

         20. Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. On appeal, a trial court's decision awarding or denying attorney fees will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.

         [296 Neb. 264] Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John A. Colborn, Judge. Affirmed.

          Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, James D. Smith, Ryan S. Post, and Jessica M. Forch for appellants.

          Amy A. Miller, of ACLU Nebraska Foundation, Inc., Leslie Cooper, of ACLU Foundation, Inc., and Garrard R. Beeney and W. Rudolph Kleysteuber, of Sullivan & Cromwell, L.L.P, for appellees.

          Robert McEwen and Sarah Helvey, of Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest, for amicus curiae Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest.

          Daniel S. Volchok and Kevin M. Lamb, of Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, L.L.P, and Robert F. Bartle, of Bartle & Geier Law Firm, for amici curiae Child Welfare League of America et al.

          Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

          WRIGHT, J.

         I. NATURE OF CASE

         The plaintiffs, three same-sex couples, sought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), to enjoin the defendants, Dave Heineman, the former Governor of the State of Nebraska; Kerry Winterer, in his official capacity as the chief executive officer of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); and Thomas Pristow, in his official capacity as the director of the Division of Children and Family Services, from enforcing a 1995 administrative memorandum and from restricting gay and lesbian individuals and couples from being considered or selected as foster or adoptive parents. The court ordered the memorandum rescinded and stricken and enjoined the defendants and those acting in concert with them from enforcing the memorandum and/or applying a categorical ban [296 Neb. 265] to gay and lesbian individuals and couples seeking to be licensed as foster care parents or to adopt a state ward. The court further ordered the defendants and those acting in concert to "refrain from adopting or applying policies, procedures, or review processes that treat gay and lesbian individuals and couples differently from similarly situated heterosexual individuals and couples when evaluating foster care or adoption applicants under the 'best interests of the child' standard set forth in DHHS' regulations." The court awarded the plaintiffs costs and attorney fees.

         The defendants appeal. They do not assert that it is constitutional to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the licensing or placement of state wards in foster care. Instead, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing because they have not yet applied for and been rejected in obtaining a foster care license or in having a state ward placed in their homes. Alternatively, the defendants argue that there was no case and controversy, because the memorandum that was the focus of the plaintiffs' complaint ceased to be the policy of DHHS by the time this lawsuit was filed, despite the fact that the memorandum was never rescinded and it remained on the DHHS website. Finally, the defendants claim that the plaintiffs' lawsuit became moot when the policy memorandum was removed from the DHHS website 3 weeks after the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was filed.

         II. BACKGROUND

         1. Complaint The complaint, filed on August 27, 2013, centered on an administrative memorandum (Memo 1-95) issued in 1995 by the then Department of Social Services, which subsequently became DHHS in 1996. Memo 1-95 was written by the director of the department and states in relevant part:

It is my decision that effective immediately, it is the policy of the Department of Social Services that children will not be placed in the homes of persons who identify [296 Neb. 266] themselves as homosexuals. This policy also applies to the area of foster home licensure in that, effective immediately, no foster home license shall be issued to persons who identify themselves as homosexuals.

         A similar policy was set forth in Memo 1-95 regarding unmarried heterosexual couples. An addendum to Memo 1-95 directed staff not to specifically ask about an individual's sexual orientation or marital status beyond those inquiries already included in the licensing application and home study. The stated reason for the policy was this State's intent to place children in the most "family-like setting" when out-of-home care is necessary. Though Memo 1-95 and the addendum stated that staff would be drafting a proposed program and licensing regulation to be brought before a public hearing in a more formal manner, such proceedings apparently never occurred.

         The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Memo 1-95 was still "in effect" as of April 1, 2013. It was not disputed by the defendants that Memo 1-95 had not been "rescinded or replaced."

         The complaint alleged that Memo 1-95 set forth a policy prohibiting the Department of Social Services, now DHHS, from issuing foster home licenses to or placing foster children with persons who identify themselves as homosexuals or unrelated, unmarried adults living together. The plaintiffs alleged that this policy also effectively banned homosexuals from adopting children from state custody, because individuals may adopt children from state care only if they have first been licensed as foster parents.

         The plaintiffs consist of three homosexual couples who alleged in the complaint that they are able and ready to apply to be foster parents and would do so but for the policy stated in Memo 1-95.

         One couple, Greg Stewart and Stillman Stewart, further alleged that they were married in 2008 in California. They alleged they had contacted DHHS in October 2012 to inquire about obtaining a foster home license. Greg and Stillman [296 Neb. 267] alleged they were told by a DHHS representative that they could not obtain a license because same-sex couples are barred from becoming licensed under DHHS policy.

         Another couple, Todd Vesely (Todd) and Joel Busch (Joel), alleged that they "began the process of applying" to become foster parents in July 2008. They completed training, a home study, and submitted to background checks. But, in 2010, Todd Reckling, the director of DHHS' Division of Children and Family Services at that time, informed Todd and Joel that it was DHHS' policy to bar licensing unrelated adults living together. In their answer, the defendants admitted that Reckling informed this couple of Memo 1-95.

         The plaintiffs generally alleged that the policy expressed in Memo 1-95 violated equal protection and due process under the state and federal Constitutions and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. They alleged that prospective foster and adoptive parents were being subjected to differential treatment on the basis of their sexual orientation, and they asserted that sexual orientation constituted a suspect class. The plaintiffs asserted that there was no compelling interest, or even a rational basis, justifying such disparate treatment. The plaintiffs asserted that the policy found in Memo 1-95 impermissibly burdened their personal liberty and privacy rights to enter into and maintain intimate personal relationships within their own homes.

         The plaintiffs asserted that they had no adequate remedy at law to redress these wrongs, which were of a continuing nature and would cause irreparable harm. They prayed for a declaration that the policy stated in Memo 1-95 is unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable, and an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing Memo 1-95.

         In addition, the plaintiffs asked for an order "directing Defendants to evaluate applications of gay and lesbian individuals and couples seeking to serve as foster or adoptive parents consistently with the evaluation process applied to applicants that are not categorically excluded."

         [296 Neb. 268] Finally, the plaintiffs asked for attorney fees and further relief as the court deemed proper.

         The defendants alleged as affirmative defenses that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action and that the defendants had not violated any of the plaintiffs' constitutional, civil, or statutory rights. The defendants did not affirmatively allege that Memo 1-95 was no longer in effect or enforced.

         2. Motions Below

         The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that on the face of the complaint, the plaintiffs lacked standing and stated no claim upon which relief could be granted. The court overruled the motion to dismiss.

         On the issue of standing, the court relied upon Gratz v. Bollinger[1] for the proposition that the injury in fact in an equal protection case is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of a barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. Under Gratz, the plaintiffs need only show they are "'able and ready'" to apply for a benefit should the discriminatory policy that prevents them from doing so be removed.[2]The court concluded that because the plaintiffs alleged they were able and ready to apply for foster care licenses, their complaint sufficiently alleged standing.

         On the issue of failure to state a claim, the court first observed that nothing in Nebraska law sets forth a policy prohibiting homosexuals or unmarried couples from fostering or adopting.[3] It then concluded that the allegations of disparate treatment were sufficient to state causes of action under equal protection and due process.

         On December 11, 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On January 27, 2015, the plaintiffs filed [296 Neb. 269] a cross-motion for summary judgment. On October 16, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. The court's orders on these motions are the subject of the current appeal.

         3. Evidence at Summary Judgment Hearing

         In support of their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs submitted affidavits in which they generally confirmed the truth of their factual allegations made in the complaint. The plaintiffs expressed their desire to serve as foster parents and "be subject to the same approval process that is applied to heterosexuals and not be subject to any discriminatory approval process based on our sexual orientation.'' Greg and Stillman clarified they no longer live in Nebraska, but that they still wish to adopt a Nebraska child out of foster care. Numerous exhibits, including the transcripts of the depositions of several DHHS employees, were also entered into evidence.

         (a) Todd Reckling

         Reckling was the director of the Division of Children and Family Services of DHHS when Todd and Joel were communicating with DHHS about the then almost 2-year delay in making any licensing or placement decision since Todd and Joel had completed all the necessary training and background checks. A letter written in June 2010, by Reckling to Todd and Joel, was entered into evidence.

         Reckling wrote to Todd and Joel that DHHS policy "allows for an exception" which would have to be made in order for either one of them to foster a child, given that they are two unmarried individuals living together. Reckling gave no indication that such an exception would be made in their case. Even if such an exception were made, Reckling explained, a child could not be placed jointly with or adopted jointly by Todd and Joel. Reckling explained that '"second parent adoptions'" were not permitted by a second person who is not married to the first and that Todd and Joel could not marry, because the [296 Neb. 270] Nebraska Constitution states that only marriage between a man and a woman shall be recognized in Nebraska.

         (b) Kerry Winterer

         Todd and Joel were subsequently in contact with Winterer, who has been the chief executive officer of DHHS since July 2009. Winterer sent a letter to Todd and Joel's attorney in November 2011, which was also entered into evidence. By that time, Todd and Joel had waited over 3 years to foster a child. In the letter, Winterer repeatedly cited to Memo 1-95. Winterer explicitly stated that "Policy Memorandum # 1-95 is still in force.''

         But in his deposition taken in July 2014, Winterer deferred to Pristow, the director of the Division of Children and Family Services for DHHS at that time, regarding the precise details of the then-current policy and the reasons for it. He noted that Pristow's practice permitted placement with homosexual applicants as long as their placement was approved by Pristow in his capacity as director.

         Winterer testified that he could imagine no reason for this extra layer of review and approval except to ensure there was no bias against persons who identify themselves as homosexual. However, he also noted that because the Nebraska Constitution does not recognize marriage between two persons of the same gender, homosexual couples who have married in another state would be considered as cohabitating, unrelated adults. Winterer then elaborated that there are "stability" concerns in placing children with cohabitating, unrelated adults. Winterer stated that the current regulations do not allow for both adults in a cohabitating, unmarried relationship to hold a joint license and that there can only be one license issued per address.

         Winterer testified he did not believe identifying as homosexual was relevant to that person's qualification as a foster or adoptive parent, but that he could envision sexual orientation being a factor in the best interests analysis, in the event [296 Neb. 271] it could cause a problem with the relationship between the biological parent and the foster parent.

         Winterer stated that Memo 1-95 was "modified by practice and ... the policy of the current director." Winterer thought that Memo 1-95 was still used in DHHS training materials. Nevertheless, he believed new employees were "informed about what the current practice is and the current process in terms of dealing with applicants." He was "assuming that [the new practice] has been communicated to [the caseworkers and supervisors in the service areas] through one means or another." He testified that there was no documentation of any new policy or practice.

         With regard to the failure to formally rescind Memo 1-95. Winterer said, "I think our attitude would be it's probably unnecessary because policy evolves and is the expression of practice and policy of the director, who is in charge of making policy for the division under which this falls." He also thought it was "probably unnecessary" to rescind Memo 1-95, which "goes back 20 years and was issued by a director of a[n] agency that no longer exists." He did not specifically discuss any possible distinction between "policy" and "practice."

         Finally, Winterer explained that there "may be, shall we say, some . . . implications" in formally rescinding Memo 1-95. Winterer stated that rescinding Memo 1-95 "could draw attention on the part of certain individuals in the state of Nebraska to . . . the issue of gay marriage and some other . . . sensitive issues" and that it could increase scrutiny and "complicate our going about doing our business." He elaborated that he was concerned formal rescission of Memo 1-95 could result in elected officials taking actions that would make it difficult for DHHS to place children with homosexual applicants.

         (c) Thomas Pristow

         In March 2012, Pristow took over Reckling's position of director of the Division of Children and Family Services for [296 Neb. 272] DHHS, and remained in that position at the time his deposition was taken in September 2014. In his deposition, Pristow indicated that it was his "understanding" that the same licensing restrictions existed for single, cohabitating, unmarried, married, heterosexual, or homosexual applicants, even before he adopted any policies or procedures with regard to homosexual applicants. He was speaking in terms of a single license, however, and not the ability to obtain a joint license. An email from 2012 indicates that legal advisors before Pristow's tenure had opined that Memo 1-95 could not be enforced as to licensing, because the regulations concerning licensing are silent on the sexual orientation of the applicant.

         But licensing is different than placement. While a child generally cannot be placed in a nonlicensed home, having a person licensed in a home does not mean a child will be placed there.

         Sometime in the summer of 2012, Pristow verbally instructed his service area administrators and his deputy director that homosexual applicants could be considered for foster or adoptive placements. Pristow did not specifically address whether this was a change in "policy" versus a change in "practice, " though most of the questions and answers referred to "policy."

         Pristow's placement protocol, hereinafter referred to as the "Pristow Procedure, " set forth different procedures for homosexual applicants than for heterosexual applicants. When a caseworker recommends a placement in the home of a married, heterosexual couple, that placement is effective if the caseworker's supervisor agrees with the recommendation. But, under the Pristow Procedure, as described by Pristow, if the caseworker recommends a placement in the home of a homosexual couple or individual, then the placement recommendation can only take effect after being approved by the caseworker's supervisor, the service area administrator, and, finally, Pristow himself. Other DHHS employees clarified that as to homosexual applicants under the Pristow Procedure there are actually five layers of placement review: the caseworker, [296 Neb. 273] the caseworker's supervisor, the administrator, the service area administrator, and then the director (Pristow).

         According to Pristow, the protocol for an unmarried heterosexual adult living with another adult-or for a married, heterosexual felon-would require only three levels of approval: the caseworker's, the caseworker's supervisor, and the service area administrator's approval to effect the placement recommendation. Other DHHS employees clarified that this would be four levels of approval, as it would include the administrator. Such applicants would not require Pristow's approval.

         Pristow explained that there was no category of applicants, other than homosexuals, that required Pristow's personal approval before a caseworker's placement recommendation could be implemented. And Pristow clarified that he did not review denials of placement with homosexual applicants. He only reviewed recommendations for placement.

         Pristow testified that there was no reason, with respect to child welfare, that a person who identifies as homosexual, or that unmarried persons living together, should be treated differently than heterosexual, married persons in the licensing or placement of a child in a foster or adoptive home. He said that in his 20 years of experience in children and family services, "gay and lesbian foster parents do just as good on - if not better than regular foster parents, everything being equal." Pristow agreed that there was a consensus in the scientific literature that the outcome for children was not adversely affected by being raised by homosexual persons, and he said that he had no reason to doubt that consensus.

         Pristow explained that Nebraska was a conservative state with a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. He "take[s] that into account when [he] make[s] these type[s] of placements." When asked how he takes that into account, Pristow explained, "I make it my decision and not the field's."

         Pristow explained that when reviewing placement recommendations with homosexual applicants, he did not consider the sexual orientation of the recommended foster or adoptive [296 Neb. 274] parent in making his decision. The applicant's sexual orientation was only relevant insofar as it was the triggering factor of the extra layer of review.

         But Pristow also indicated that Nebraska's laws and the constitutional amendment regarding homosexual couples were somehow taken into account in his decisonmaking:

I do work for the State, and I am supportive of its laws and its amendments to the constitution. And I take that in balance when I, you know, make those type[s] of decisions about placing children in gay and lesbian foster homes. . . .
. . . [T]his is a conservative state, and I'm cognizant of that, and I want to make sure that I - that my process is - has foundation, and that, again, it reflects what the best interest of that child is ... .

         Pristow, however, denied that he took a "harder look" at placements with homosexual applicants. And he stated that he had no reason to doubt the competency of caseworkers and their supervisors in making best interests decisions. He explained that it is just "a process so that I can take on the responsibility of making that decision from the field so that these placements can be made in accordance with the best interests of the child."

         Pristow acknowledged that, as of the time of the deposition in September 2014, Memo 1-95 was still on DHHS' website and that there was nothing in writing on the website or elsewhere disavowing the policies stated in Memo 1-95. To the contrary, it was his understanding that Memo 1-95 was included in the packet of administrative memorandums that was given to new trainees as they enter into the system.

         Neither was there anything in writing, to his knowledge, reflecting the Pristow Procedure. But Pristow said that, as new trainees go out into the field, they are supposed to be told of it. Pristow was unsure exactly how thoroughly this was done. He explained:

[296 Neb. 275] As the new trainee goes out to the field, either through a mentoring protocol that we have or through [his or her] new supervisor, there is - they are - they begin to learn the practice of how we do child welfare in Nebraska. And as this would come up or when it does come up, they are told of the protocol that I put - the policy that I put in place verbally.
... I can't speak to whether [a caseworker, when approached for the first time by a homosexual applicant] would know [Memo 1-95 is no longer the current practice] . My instructions were to the service area administrators when I gave my verbal policy out, and my direction was to make sure that it was disseminated throughout the field.

         Pristow agreed that there "might be some confusion" for new employees as to whether Memo 1-95 is still DHHS' policy and practice, but he believed "the field is very competent, very competent in making sure that information is disseminated and that we look out for the best interests of the child and we find the best ...


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