Gary Hughes; Arash Yarpezeshkan; David Mazgaj Plaintiffs-Appellants
City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Gatso USA, Inc. Defendants-Appellees Edward G. Robinson Plaintiff James Louis Sparks; Jerry Northrup Plaintiffs-Appellants Daniel Ray French Plaintiff Jeffrey V. Stimpson; Roger L. Lee; Krisanne M. Duhaime; Gerald R. Duhaime; Susan M. Dumbaugh Plaintiffs-Appellants
Submitted: September 20, 2016
from United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
LOKEN, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
BENTON, Circuit Judge
of drivers sued the City of Cedar Rapids and Gatso USA, Inc.,
arguing that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system
violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed
the drivers' claims. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part,
2011, the City, by ordinance, authorized an ATE system. Cedar
Rapids, Iowa Mun. Code § 61.138. The City contracted
with Gatso to install and operate the system. When a vehicle
speeds or runs a red light, an ATE camera takes an image.
Gatso then mails a Notice of Violation to the vehicle owner.
The drivers sued in Iowa state court, arguing that the ATE
system violates their right to procedural due process, their
fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code § 602.6101, and
causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. They removed
the case to federal court and moved to dismiss.
district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing:
Gary Hughes and David L. Mazgaj's claims, and the
procedural-due-process claims of Edward G. Robinson, James L.
Sparks, Jeffrey L. Northrup, Arash C. Yarpezeshkan, Daniel R.
French, and Jeffrey V. Stimpson. For the drivers with
standing, the district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim. On appeal, the drivers contend that the district court
erred by dismissing their complaint and not remanding to
state court those claims dismissed for lack of standing.
to the City and Gatso, drivers Hughes, Mazgaj, and Roger L.
Lee lack Article III standing for their claims. This court
reviews standing determinations de novo. Plymouth Cty.,
Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (8th Cir.
III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must
show 1) an injury in fact, 2) a sufficient causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of, and 3) a
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has
the burden to establish these elements. Id.
City and Gatso object to Hughes's Article III standing,
claiming he has no injury in fact. Hughes asserts a
"fear that, as a Vehicle Owner regularly using the roads
in Cedar Rapids, [he] may be subject to . . . civil liability
resulting from the operation of the City's fixed or
mobile ATE system's cameras." He has not received a
Notice of Violation. A person threatened with law enforcement
may challenge the law "under circumstances that render
the threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent."
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334,
2342 (2014). The person need not demonstrate it is
"literally certain that the harms they identify will
come about." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l. USA,
133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). Standing may be based on a
"substantial risk" of harm that prompts plaintiffs
to "reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that
does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or
avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an
ATE citation is sufficiently imminent. Hughes does not have
City and Gatso claim Mazgaj has no injury in fact. His wife
received the Notice of Violation, but Mazgaj was driving the
car (which she owned). He asserts third-party standing on
behalf of his wife. "[T]here may be circumstances where
it is necessary to grant a third-party standing to assert the
rights of another." Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543
U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004). For example, a plaintiff may show
"a close relationship with the person who possesses the
right" and "a hindrance to the possessor's
ability to protect [her] own interests." Id. at
fails to show a hindrance to his wife's ability to
protect her own interests. He does not have third-party
standing. Mazgaj believes he need not assert third-party
standing. But then his claim is just a "generally
available grievance . . . seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652,
2662 (2013). Mazgaj does not state an Article III case or
to the City and Gatso, Lee's claims are not ripe for
adjudication. "[T]he ripeness inquiry requires the
examination of both 'the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.'" Pub. Water
Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570,
572-73 (8th Cir. 2003), quoting Abbott Labs v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Fitness depends on
whether a case needs further factual development.
Id. Hardship requires that the plaintiff "has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as the result of the challenged statute or
official conduct." Id. The plaintiff "must
necessarily satisfy both prongs to at least a minimal
degree." Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy
Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
satisfies both prongs. He was found guilty of violating the
ordinance; no further factual development is necessary. Lee
has the hardship of citation and ...