United States District Court, D. Nebraska
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
R. Zwart United States Magistrate Judge.
matter is before the court on Defendant Isa M. Harris'
Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion to Dismiss, (Filing
Nos. 25 and 29). For the reasons set forth
below, the motions should be denied.
April 22, 2015 Isa Harris was indicted in the District of
Nebraska for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
(Filing No. 1). An arrest warrant was issued for
Harris on April 23, 2015. The case was assigned to an
Investigator with the Lincoln Police Department
(“LPD”) and he was responsible for finding Harris
and bringing him into custody. The LPD subsequently sought
assistance from the United States Marshal's Service
(“USMS”) in apprehending Harris on May 29, 2015.
The information provided to the USMS indicated Harris'
last known address was 115 Harris Street, Bay Point,
California. On May 29, 2015, a Deputy Marshal with the USMS
in Lincoln, Nebraska entered the warrant with the National
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) - a database
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigations that
compiles information regarding previous arrests, convictions,
warrants, and other criminal history for individuals across
the country. He later validated the warrant on August 11,
time the warrant was first issued, Harris was in custody in
San Jose, California on a California state charge and
remained there until July 4, 2015. He was released from
custody in California apparently without the authorities in
California realizing there was an active warrant for his
arrest due to the charges in Nebraska federal court.
was again arrested by the San Francisco Sheriff's
Department (“SFSD”) on or about February 8, 2016
on the Nebraska issued warrant. The USMS in California sent
the SFSD a “detainer” instructing the SFSD to
contact the USMS prior to releasing Harris. The USMS for
Northern California asserts the SFSD notified it on March 11,
2016 the USMS could take custody of Harris. The SFSD has no
record of making any such notification.
March 14, 2016, Harris was brought before the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California for a
Rule 5 proceeding. He was transported to Nebraska
and had his Initial Appearance and Arraignment on the
indictment on May 10, 2016. His trial was originally
scheduled for June 27, 2016. (Filing No. 14).
Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss on May 9, 2016,
(Filing No. 16). The motion was denied without
prejudice to re-filing with the assistance of his
court-appointed counsel. (Filing No. 23). The motion
to dismiss now before the court was filed on June 6, 2016,
(Filing No. 25) and amended on June 15, 2016.
(Filing No. 29).
asserts his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been
The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
... trial....” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth
Amendment right “attaches at the time of arrest or
indictment, whichever comes first, and continues until the
trial commences.” United States v.
Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir.2003).
United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008, 1018-19 (8th
determining whether a defendant's Constitutional right to
a speedy trial has been violated the court considers four
factors: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for delay; 3)
whether the defendant asserted the right to speedy trial; and
4) whether the defendant suffered any prejudice. Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
assessing the impact of the length of the delay, the court
must first determine whether there has been an
“uncommonly long” delay between indictment and
trial. United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940
(8th Cir. 2011). This inquiry has two parts. First,
“[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an
accused must allege that the interval between accusation and
trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from
‘presumptively prejudicial' delay.”
Dogget v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52
(1992)). Second, “the court must then consider . . .
the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the
claim.” Id. at 652.
threshold for finding a presumptively prejudicial delay is a
delay of approximately 12 months from indictment to trial.
See United States v. Titlbach,339 F.3d 692, 699
(8th Cir. 2003). Thus, any delay over approximately a year -
such as the one in this case - is presumptively prejudicial.
Id. The first Barker factor weighs in favor of
Harris. However, the delay in this case is only slightly over