United States District Court, D. Nebraska
BRANDON R. JOHNSON, Plaintiff
SCOTT FRAKES, Director, and his individual capacity, DIANE SABATKA-RINE, Deputy Director, and her individual capacity, MARIO PEART, Warden, and his individual capacity, HARGREAVES, Unite Administrator, and his individual capacity, KARA SIMPSON, Unit Administrator, and her individual capacity, and JOHN DOES-1-15, and their individual capacities, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge
matter is before the court on initial review of Plaintiff
Brandon Johnson’s Complaint. (Filing No. 1.)
For the reasons that follow, the court finds
Plaintiff’s pleadings do not state any claims on which
relief may be granted. However, the court will allow
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is currently incarcerated at the Lincoln Correctional Center
in Lincoln, Nebraska. Plaintiff instituted this action on
April 11, 2016, naming the following defendants: (1) Nebraska
Department of Corrections Director Scott Frakes; (2) Nebraska
Department of Corrections Deputy Director Diane Sabatka-Rine;
(3)Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center Mario Peart; (4)
Nebraska Department of Corrections Unit Administrator
Hargreaves; (5) Nebraska Department of Corrections Unit
Manager Kara Simpson; and (6) John Does employed at Lincoln
Correctional Center. (Filing No. 1.)
sets forth several unrelated allegations in his Complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that in 2001, while he was incarcerated at
the Diagnostics and Evaluation Center, he was diagnosed with
“HEP C.” Recently, he became aware of a cure for
HEP C are requested treatment. His request was denied.
Defendant Peart informed Plaintiff that he would be
reevaluated for treatment in November, 2016.
Plaintiff alleges that in 2005, he was attacked by a prison
group known as the “Sorenos.” Plaintiff maintains
that between 2005 and 2008 he was continually targeted,
threatened, and attacked by the group. Plaintiff asserts that
he has told prison staff that he feared for his safety, but
that they did not take action to protect him.
Plaintiff claims that mail addressed to the court was handled
improperly by prison staff.
STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis
complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an
officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e) and 1915A. The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a
frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. §
plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to
“nudge their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a
general indication of the type of litigation
involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir.
1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be
liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a
lesser pleading standard than other parties.”
Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
construed, Plaintiff alleges federal constitutional claims.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
United States Constitution or created by federal statute and
also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by
conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v.
Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).