United States District Court, D. Nebraska
Dakota Parsons, Denice Parsons, Plaintiffs: Diana J. Vogt,
James D. Sherrets, SHERRETS, BRUNO LAW FIRM, Omaha, NE.
Blane McCann, individually and as Superintendent of Westside
Community Schools, Kent Kingston, individually and as
Executive Director of Westside Community Schools, Westside
Community Schools, Defendants: John M. Lingelbach, Margaret
C. Hershiser, Peter J. Leo, KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM, Omaha,
Brenda Beadle, individually and in her official capacity as a
Douglas County Attorney, Don Kleine, a Douglas County
Attorney, Douglas County Attorney Office, Mark Foxall, as
Director of the Douglas County Department of Corrections,
Douglas County Nebraska, a political subdivision of the
State, Defendants: Timothy K. Dolan, DOUGLAS COUNTY
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE - CIVIL DIVISION, Omaha, NE.
City of Omaha, Omaha Police Department, Defendants: Ryan J.
Wiesen, Thomas O. Mumgaard, CITY OF OMAHA, Omaha, NE.
G. Kopf, Senior United States District Judge.
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action stemming from plaintiff Dakota
Parsons' 29-week stay in the Douglas County Corrections
Center while he was a participant in Young Adult Court,
allegedly without a probable cause hearing, without being
charged with an offense, and without the opportunity to be
released on bond. After my previous order (Filing 52) finding
that Plaintiffs' original complaint failed to state a
federal claim upon which relief may be granted--but giving
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint--Plaintiffs have
filed an amended complaint (Filing 54), and Defendants have
filed another round of motions to dismiss (Filings 55, 58,
60, 62, 66).
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT
Parsons (" Dakota" ) and his mother, Denice Parsons
(" Denice" or " Dakota's mother" ),
allege numerous claims arising from an incident at Westside
High School (" WHS" ) in Omaha, Nebraska, that
occurred following a band concert on October 25,
2012. Dakota, who was a student at WHS,
threw a firecracker out of a door following the concert. The
firecracker exploded on the pavement, and no one was injured.
During school the next day, October 26, 2012, Dakota's
backpack was searched, and it was found to contain materials
to make another firecracker, or exploding device, and
marijuana. Police subsequently searched the Parsons'
home, allegedly finding additional marijuana in Dakota's
room. Dakota was arrested and charged with possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, unlawful possession of
explosive materials, and possession of a destructive device.
his arrest, and after an administrative hearing, Dakota was
informed that he would be expelled from school until January
2014. Dakota appealed the decision, and his term of expulsion
was reduced to the remainder of the 2012-2013 school year. On
November 30, 2012, defendant Blane McCann ("
McCann" ), Westside Community Schools Superintendent,
sent a certified letter to Dakota's mother confirming
that Dakota would be expelled for the remainder of the
2012-2013 school year and expressing his "
disappointment with the hearing officer's
January 14, 2013, Dakota appeared before a judge, who dropped
his bond requirement and released Dakota on his own
recognizance. Dakota, his counsel, and defendant Brenda
Beadle, a Douglas County Attorney, agreed that Dakota's
case should be transferred to the Young Adult Court ("
YAC" ). Dakota was officially accepted into the YAC on
February 15, 2013. Dakota and Denice Parsons met with WHS
school officials in April 2013 regarding Dakota's
continued education. WHS agreed to provide a tutor, and
Dakota signed up to take high school classes online through
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
17, 2013, Dakota appeared before a district judge in charge
of the YAC. He entered a plea of no contest to unlawful
possession of explosive materials in the first degree, a
class IV felony, and the two other charges were dropped.
Dakota signed a court order and agreement to participate in
the YAC program. (Filing 46-1 at CM/ECF pp.
3-7.) This program imposed a number of
conditions upon Dakota that he agreed to follow, including
" submit[ting] to search and seizure of your premises,
person or vehicle upon request of the YAC staff," not
" associat[ing] with anyone who possesses firearms,
ammunition or illegal weapons," and not "
possess[ing] firearms, ammunition or illegal weapons."
The agreement also provided that " [a]ny violation of
the above conditions is cause for revocation of participation
in the Young Adult Court and a sentence to confinement,"
as well as " revocation of Defendant's bond . . .
[and] violation of probation charges being filed against
him/her." Because Dakota was a minor, the 90-day YAC
incarceration period was waived, and he was required to wear
an ankle monitor until he turned 18.
10, 2013, Dakota turned 18 and his ankle monitor was removed.
Dakota continued to satisfactorily progress through the YAC
program, including being subject to drug testing, undergoing
a chemical-dependency test, and calling a YAC representative
each evening to check in. On July 23, 2013, Denice and Dakota
Parsons met with a WHS guidance counselor to establish a
timetable for completing online classwork before the
beginning of Dakota's senior year on August 15, 2013.
25, 2013, the police came to the Parsons' residence
because they had received a report that Dakota had been
observed " making explosives." Denice Parsons
informed the police that the prior day, a company named
Midwest Wildlife Solutions had used a trap and smoke device
to treat the Parsons' lawn for groundhogs. Nevertheless,
the police conducted a search of the home and removed some
" old, unusable fireworks from the garage." Dakota
left a voice message for Nick Lurz of the YAC regarding the
July 25, 2013, police visit. Lurz did not respond to the
message, but on August 2, 2013, Lurz conducted a visit and
search of Plaintiffs' home. Lurz found some airsoft guns
and pellets, but did not inform Dakota and his mother that
these items were a violation of Dakota's YAC agreement.
Denice agreed to remove these items from the home.
allege that in early August 2013, " unknown members of
the Westside school system (on information and belief
including McCann), unknown members of the Omaha Police
Department, and possibly other persons met to
'discuss' Parsons." Plaintiffs do not have
" any detailed information regarding the participants at
this meeting or the substance of the discussion." The
Parsons allege that this meeting was " instigated by
McCann and/or other representatives of Westside Community
Schools as part of a plan to keep Parsons from returning to
school on August 15, 2013 as required by the hearing
officer's order." Neither Dakota nor his attorney
were informed about the meeting, and Dakota's counsel did
not learn of the meeting until Douglas County Attorney Brenda
Beadle told counsel about the meeting " several months
after the meeting occurred." Plaintiffs allege that
Beadle met with, and took directions from, a member of the
school board " without having a complaint from a law
enforcement agency," and that Beadle " agree[d] to
have Parsons arrested for the purpose of keeping him out of
Westside High School." Plaintiffs claim that Beadle
inserted herself into this investigatory meeting and provided
advice and direction to the police.
August 12, 2013, Dakota was scheduled to take a final
educational test that was necessary for him to return to WHS
on August 15. However, on that same day, YAC representatives
appeared at the Parsons' home in bullet-proof vests,
followed shortly thereafter by several Omaha police officers,
who confiscated several items from the home. The officers did
not communicate the reason for the search to Dakota and
Denice Parsons. Dakota was arrested and jailed in the Douglas
County Corrections Center (" DCC" ) without being
informed of the charges or what precipitated his arrest.
Plaintiffs allege that Dakota was arrested without probable
cause and without a valid warrant because the warrant
indicated that he had violated " probation," but he
had never been placed on probation. (Filing 46-1 at CM/ECF p.
9.) The plaintiffs also assert that the warrant was invalid
because it was not supported by an affidavit.
October 17, 2013, Dakota had his first hearing regarding the
August 12, 2013, arrest. During the hearing, neither the
Douglas County Attorney nor the YAC presented the reason for
Dakota's August 12, 2013, arrest; the court ordered a
psychological examination; and Dakota continued to be jailed
without bond. Thereafter, additional hearings were held
regarding the county attorney's request that Dakota
continue to be held without bond. As of January 2014, after
being jailed for five months, Dakota had still not received a
probable cause hearing and had not been informed of the facts
supporting the August 2013 arrest.
about February 7, 2014, Dakota's attorney filed a writ of
habeas corpus alleging Dakota's unlawful detention at
DCC. A hearing on the writ of habeas corpus was scheduled for
March 6, 2014. One day before the hearing was to occur, the
YAC judge ordered Dakota released on his own recognizance,
without bond being required, and without Dakota having to
appear in court. Plaintiffs allege that Dakota was unlawfully
arrested and falsely imprisoned for a total of 203 days. As a
result, Dakota suffers from " PTSD" and other
" ongoing psychological ill effects." Further,
Dakota asserts that Westside Community Schools refuses to
allow him to complete his education and graduate.
plaintiffs allege that the state-run YAC program allows
prosecutors " complete discretion in recommending
actions to the taken by the Court," lacks " firm
standards . . . regarding when a participant may be
jailed," and " always follow[s] the recommendations
of the county attorney." Plaintiffs allege that "
prosecutors in the county attorney's office have complete
and unfettered discretion to determine who is jailed for what
matters," and " the program is abused by the County
Attorney's office as a regular practice." The
plaintiffs state that if imprisonment standards had been in
place, Beadle " could not have agreed to have Parsons
jailed for the purpose of keeping him from returning to
Westside High School for his senior year."
specifically state that the " policies, customs and
practices" of Douglas County, the City of Omaha, and the
Omaha Police Department " allow a participant in YAC to
be arrested and held without bond and without a showing of
proximate [sic] cause at the unfettered discretion of the
county attorney." Specifically, the " Douglas
County Prosecuting Attorney's office has established a
pattern and practice of utilizing the lack of standards and
the complete and unfettered discretion of the prosecutors to
direct the arrest of YAC participants regardless of probable
cause." Further, Plaintiffs assert that Westside
Community Schools has " policies, customs and
practices" that gave defendant McCann and other
administrators " the ability to act contrary to the
determination of the hearing officer who directed that
Parsons be allowed to return to school. Westside allows
administrators unfettered discretion to interfere with the
right to attend school and the right to have the benefit of
the decision of an administrative hearing officer regarding
seek monetary damages, punitive damages, the return of all
personal property confiscated from Plaintiffs' home,
costs, attorney's fees, an injunction directing the
Douglas County Attorney to establish standards for arrest and
bail applicable to all defendants in the YAC program, and
other relief as may be appropriate.
allege several claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(1) False arrest claim against Beadle,
Kleine, the Douglas County Attorney's Office, Douglas
County, Omaha Police Department (" OPD" ), the City
of Omaha, McCann, Westside Community Schools, and Does 1-15
(police officers) for arresting Dakota without a valid
warrant and without probable cause;
(2) Wrongful search and seizure claim
against Douglas County, OPD, the City of Omaha, and Does 1-15
(police officers) for their search of the Parsons'
residence on August 12, 2013, performed without a warrant,
without probable cause, and not under the YAC agreement;
(3) Unlawful imprisonment claim against
Foxall (individually and as Director of the Douglas County
Department of Corrections), Beadle, Kleine, Douglas County,
McCann, and Westside Community Schools for causing Dakota to
be jailed and detained without bond for almost seven months
without being charged with any crime;
(4) Equal protection claim against McCann
for refusing to allow Dakota to attend WHS to earn his
diploma after his expulsion was completed;
(5) Civil conspiracy claim against all
defendants for conspiring to prevent Dakota from returning to
school by taking him into custody without a properly
supported warrant or probable cause and keeping him confined
without bond and a showing of probable cause; and
(6) Eighth Amendment claim against Beadle
and the Douglas County Attorney's Office for requesting
that Dakota be held without bond without showing that Dakota
was a flight risk or a risk to community safety.
also assert what appear to be state-law claims:
(7) Abuse of process claim against the
Douglas County Attorney's Office, Beadle, "
representatives" of WHS, and OPD for utilizing the
court's process of arrest and setting bail for the "
ulterior motive of arresting Parsons and keeping him
incarcerated so that he could not return to school" ;
(8) Violation of " Free Instruction" Clause
of Nebraksa Constitution & Neb. Rev. Stat. §
79-283 against McCann for refusing to allow Dakota
to attend WHS to earn his diploma after his expulsion was
completed, in violation of the Nebraska Constitution, which
provides for " free instruction in the common
schools" and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-283 (Westlaw
2015), which provides that if a student is expelled from
school during the first term of the school year, the maximum
period for which the student may be expelled is for the
remainder of the school year.
Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). " A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This
" plausibility standard" is not one of
probability, " but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. Where a complaint contains
facts that are " merely consistent with" a
defendant's liability, it " stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to
relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "
But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged--but it has not
'show[n]'--'that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). " While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations." Id. " Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at
The Motions to Dismiss
Omaha Police Department; Douglas County Attorney's
Office; Beadle, Kleine & Foxall in Official
a party, other than an individual or a corporation, has the
capacity to be sued is determined " by the law of the
state where the court is located." Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b).
Each county in Nebraska may sue and be sued in its own name,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-101 (Westlaw 2015), but the same is
not true of county offices or departments. See
Winslow v. Smith, 672 F.Supp.2d 949, 964 (D. Neb.
2009) (sheriff's and county attorney's offices);
Griggs v. Douglas County Corrections Center, No.
8:07CV404, 2008 WL 1944557, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 29, 2008)
(county corrections department); Holmstedt v. York County
Jail Supervisor (Name Unknown), 15 Neb.App. 893, 739
N.W.2d 449, 461 (Neb.App. 2007) (county sheriff's
department), rev'd on other grounds, 275 Neb.
161, 745 N.W.2d 317 (Neb. 2008); Jameson v.
Plischke, 184 Neb. 97, 165 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Neb. 1969)
(county board of supervisors). Further, cities of the
metropolitan class may sue and be sued, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 14-101 (Westlaw 2015), but the same is not true of
city police departments. Meyer v. Lincoln Police
Dep't, 347 F.Supp.2d 706 (D. Neb. 2004) (city police
department is agency of city and has no separate legal status
under Nebraska law); Williams v. Raynor Rensch &
Pfieffer, No. 8:11CV446, 2015 WL 2127095 (D. Neb. May 6,
2015) (city police department is subdivision or department of
city government and is not separately subject to suit).
Therefore, defendants Omaha Police Department and the Douglas
County Attorney's Office must be dismissed from this case
as not subject to suit.
note that Plaintiffs' claims against Brenda Beadle in her
official capacity as Douglas County Attorney, Don Kleine in
his official capacity as Douglas County Attorney, and Mark
Foxall in his official capacity as Director of the Douglas
County Department of Corrections are actually claims against
Douglas County itself. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460
F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (" A suit against a public
official in his official capacity is actually a suit against
the entity for which the official is an agent." );
Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203 n.1 (8th Cir.
1992) (" Suits against persons in their official
capacity are just another method of filing suit against the
entity. A plaintiff seeking damages in an official-capacity
suit is seeking a judgment against the entity." )
(citation omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against
Beadle, Kleine, and Foxall in their official capacities will
be dismissed as redundant of their claims against Douglas
County. Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d
1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010); Artis v. Francis Howell North
Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th
City of Omaha
purport to bring section 1983 claims against the City of
Omaha for false arrest, wrongful search and seizure, and
civil conspiracy pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs' claims are based on the actions of several
City of Omaha police officers who allegedly wrongfully
arrested Dakota Parsons, searched the Parsons' home
without a valid warrant, and seized property from the home at
the request of, and in concert with, defendants McCann and
Westside Community Schools to prevent Dakota from returning
to school, and not for the valid purposes of
insuring compliance with the YAC agreement or investigating
possible violations of the law. (Filing 54 ¶ ¶
119-136.) Plaintiffs further allege that City of Omaha
policies, customs, and practices proximately caused the
constitutional violations at issue in this case, and that the
" City of Omaha is liable for the misconduct of the John
Doe defendants [police officers] because the policies,
customs and practices of the City of Omaha and the Omaha
Police Department allow a participant in YAC to be
arrested and held without bond and without a showing
of proximate [sic] cause at the unfettered
discretion of the county attorney."
(Filing 54 ¶ 116 (use of italics indicates new language
added to amended complaint).) The City of Omaha moves to
dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). (Filing 55.)
§ 1983 Actions Against Municipalities
A municipality may be liable under § 1983 where
'action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort.'"
Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann, No. 14-1583, 800
F.3d 985, 2015 WL 5155354, at *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015)
(quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). The
Supreme Court invalidated heightened pleading requirements in
section 1983 suits against municipalities in Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517
(1993). " When a complaint is filed, a plaintiff may not
be privy to the facts necessary to accurately describe or
identify any policies or customs which may have caused the
deprivation of a constitutional right. Moreover, such a
holding would disregard the liberality of Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2) which requires merely 'a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,' and 8(f), which states 'pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice.' . . . At a
minimum, a complaint must allege facts which would support
the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom."
Doe ex rel. Doe v. School Dist. of City of Norfolk,
340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003).
plaintiff is not required to make specific reference to an
unconstitutional policy or custom to survive a motion to
dismiss; rather, a plaintiff's complaint must contain
" allegations, reference, or language by which one could
begin to draw an inference that the conduct complained of . .
. resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom of the
[defendant]." Id. (" the failure of the
[plaintiffs] to specifically plead the existence of an
unconstitutional policy or custom, in itself, is not fatal to
their claim for relief" ); Crumpley-Patterson v.
Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir.
2004) (the plaintiff " need not . . . specifically plead
the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to
survive a motion to dismiss" ).
is " an important distinction between claims based on
official policies and claims based on customs. Because an
official policy speaks for itself about the intent of public
officials, proof of a single act by a policymaker may be
sufficient to support liability." Jenkins v. County
of Hennepin, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
McGautha v. Jackson County, 36 F.3d 53, 56 (8th Cir.
1994)); see also Crawford v. Van Buren
County, 678 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2012) ("
Although rare, a public official's single incident of
unconstitutional activity can establish the requisite policy
if the decision is taken by the highest officials responsible
for setting policy in that area of the government's
business." (internal quotation marks and citation
To establish the existence of a policy, [a plaintiff] must
point to 'a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or
procedure made by the municipal official who has final
authority regarding such matters.'"
Jenkins, 557 F.3d at 633 (quoting Mettler v.
Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999)). A
plaintiff " must also show that the policy was
unconstitutional and that it was 'the moving force'
behind the harm that he suffered." Id. Two
circumstances that may lead to municipal liability are (1) a
municipality's action or policy " itself violates
federal law, or directs an employee to do so," and (2)
where " an official policy is lawful on its face and
does not compel unconstitutional action," but "
municipal action has led an employee to violate a
plaintiff's rights," and that action was "
taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious
consequences." Hollingsworth, 2015 WL 5155354,
at *5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While
it is not clear which of these circumstances exists at this
very early stage in the case, I conclude that Plaintiffs'
new allegations in their amended complaint are sufficient to
allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy of the
City of Omaha. Accordingly, I shall deny the City of
Omaha's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' section 1983
" policy" claims against it, without prejudice to
the City raising the same argument in a properly supported
motion for summary judgment.
In contrast to the evidence required to establish an official
policy, [the Eighth Circuit has] emphasized that a custom can
be shown only by adducing evidence of a 'continuing,
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct.'" Jenkins, 557 F.3d at 634
(quoting Mettler, 165 F.3d at 1204). "
'[L]iability may be established through proof that the
alleged misconduct was so pervasive among the non-policy
making employees of the municipality as to constitute a
" custom or usage" with the force of
law,'" and therefore liability " 'cannot
arise from a single act.'" Crawford, 678
F.3d at 669 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting McGautha, 36
F.3d at 56-57).
their amended complaint, the plaintiffs have only alleged an
isolated incident of police misconduct involving Dakota
Parsons; there are no allegations that the City of Omaha and
its police officers engaged in such conduct with others. As
with their original complaint, the plaintiffs have still not
alleged facts suggesting a continuing, widespread, persistent
pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the City of Omaha
and its employee police officers. (Filing 52 at CM/ECF p. 7.)
Even if Plaintiffs' allegations could be construed to
suggest such a pattern or custom, they have failed to allege
any facts whatsoever of deliberate indifference to, or tacit
authorization of, the pattern of misconduct. Therefore, the
City of Omaha's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) shall be granted with regard to
Plaintiffs' " custom" claims against the City
Mark Foxall Individually
bring section 1983 claims against Mark Foxall, Director of
the Douglas County Department of Corrections, individually,
for civil conspiracy and unlawful imprisonment because Foxall
" caused Parsons to be jailed and detained without being
charged with any crime or violation and to be held without
bond." (Filing 54, Amended Complaint ¶ 139.)
Plaintiffs assert that Dakota Parsons was jailed based on a
bench warrant that was not supported by an affidavit of
probable cause, was " arrested and held in jail for an
extended time at the request of McCann to prevent Parsons
from returning to school," and " was jailed for
nearly seven months without being informed of the charges
against him and without being allowed bond." (Filing 54
¶ ¶ 140-143.) Foxall moves to dismiss the claims
against him, arguing that the amended complaint does not
allege that he was personally involved in the wrongful
conduct or, alternatively, that he is entitled to qualified
immunity or quasi-judicial absolute immunity. (Filing 59 at
CM/ECF p. 1.)
To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim, a
plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant conspired with
others to deprive him of constitutional rights; (2) that at
least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt
act injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff is additionally
required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or
privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil
Burton v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 731
F.3d 784, 798 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs purport to allege a civil conspiracy against
" all Defendants" (Filing 54 at CM/ECF p. 25 (Count
V heading)), but fail to allege any facts whatsoever
regarding Foxall. Plaintiffs allege that defendants Beadle,
the Douglas County Attorney's Office, representatives of
Westside High School, and members of the Omaha Police
Department met and " conspired to find a way to prevent
Parsons from returning to school," using an unlawful
arrest and detention to do so. (Filing 54 at CM/ECF ¶
are simply no allegations that Foxall participated in any
aspect of this alleged conspiracy and, for that reason,
Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim against Foxall
individually must be dismissed. Mayorga v. Missouri,
442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (" To establish
personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [the
plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement
in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his
constitutional rights." ); Madewell v. Roberts,
909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. ...