United States District Court, D. Nebraska
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
John M. Gerrard United States District Judge
Plaintiff Beatrice Hudson filed her Complaint (Filing No. 1) on March 25, 2015. This court has given Hudson leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. The court now conducts an initial review of Hudson’s Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Hudson described a series of events that occurred between November of 2014 and March of 2015. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) It is not apparent from her allegations how or whether the described events are related.
Hudson alleged she was hired by Tri-Con Industry (“Tri-Con”) in November of 2014, but her employment was later terminated after she filed a complaint with the “State Capital, Attorney General” that “outlin[ed] Tri-Con  and the such, etc.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.) Hudson also alleged that, on November 26, 2014, she was subjected to slander, libel, and verbal abuse at a U-Stop and that, on this same date, U-Stop and the Lincoln Police Department conspired to violate her civil rights. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 2.) Finally, Hudson set forth that she has a state court case currently pending against Tri-Con, U-Stop, and the Lincoln Police Department (the same defendants present in this case). Hudson alleged Tri-Con, U-Stop, and the Lincoln Police Department have failed to “acknowledge the case.” (Id. at CM/ECF p. 6.) For relief, Hudson seeks “justice in this court” and “in state court.” (Id. at CM/ECF p. 10.)
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court reviews in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Liberally construed, Hudson raised a retaliation claim against Tri-Con. She alleged Tri-Con terminated her employment after she filed a complaint with the “State Capital, Attorney General.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.) To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal nexus exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2011).
Even liberally read, the complaint fails to plead any facts linking the termination of Hudson’s employment to the complaint she filed with the “State Capital, Attorney General.” Indeed, it is entirely unclear why Hudson filed this action against Tri-Con. Therefore, Hudson has not stated a retaliation claim against Tri-Con upon which relief may be granted. On ...