United States District Court, D. Nebraska
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD G. KOPF, Senior District Judge.
This action was filed by Cameron Chrisp ("Chrisp" or "Plaintiff"), a pro se litigant incarcerated at the Hall County Department of Corrections in Grand Island, Nebraska. He filed his complaint (Filing No. 1) in this case on October 27, 2014, at which time he was incarcerated at the Lancaster County Jail in Lincoln, Nebraska. The court previously ordered Chrisp to file an amended complaint, which he did on April 15, 2015 (Filing No. 30). The court now conducts an initial review of Chrisp's amended complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Liberally construed, Chrisp brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The named defendants are Lancaster County, Nebraska, the Lancaster County Jail, Correct Care Solutions, Mike Thurber, and Sargent Schaffer. (Filing No. 30 at CM/ECF p. 1.) Chrisp also named "PSN # 5530" as a defendant; however, the court will disregard this reference because Chrisp provided no indication of what "PSN # 5530" refers to.
Chrisp alleged jail staff did not give him the pain medication Tramadol on 20 occasions between December of 2014 and February of 2015. ( Id. at CM/ECF p. 2.) Chrisp alleged he suffered from "multiple chronic physical conditions" that have "not been surgically corrected." ( Id. ) He alleged:
Nurses informed me that as of Dec 2014 The Jail & Jail Medical lacked proper drug license to continue to purchase tramadol in bulk or in large enough Quantities to ensure tramadol for all inmates who were prescribed tramadol within the Jail. I was told by some medical staff that the law which changed tramadol from a schedule 3 narcotic to a schedule z narcotic went into effect around December 2014 for which the Jail nor Jail Medical Company had made the appropriate or necessary changes or adjustments to continue purchasing [enough] tramadol for all inmates prescribed within the Jail.
( Id. at CM/ECF p. 3.)
Chrisp stated these events caused him "excessive" suffering, and they interfered with his "ability to exercise [his] constitutional rights." ( Id. ) For relief, Chrisp seeks "damages." ( Id. at CM/ECF p. 6.)
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, " or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. ...