Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Castonguay v. Department of Correctional Service

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

April 20, 2015

PAUL CASTONGUAY, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICE, MICHAEL KENNEY, Director, and BRIAN GAGE, Warden, Respondents.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BATAILLON, Senior District Judge.

I. INITIAL REVIEW

This matter is before the court on initial review of Petitioner Paul Castonguay's ("Castonguay" or "Petitioner") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Filing No. 1.) The court will dismiss the petition because it is a second or successive habeas corpus petition that has not been authorized by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The statutory prohibition against successive petitions by state prisoners is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which provides in relevant part:

(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless-
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

In Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332-33 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that "the phrase second or successive' must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged." In other words, the phrase "second or successive" applies to entire habeas petitions, and not to individual claims in those petitions. Id.

This court's records reflect that Castonguay's petition is successive. He challenges his 2009 conviction in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, for sexual assault. Castonguay unsuccessfully challenged this same conviction in earlier federal habeas corpus litigation. ( See Castonguay v. Tecumseh Institution, Case No. 4:11CV3145, Filing No. 55 (dismissing petition with prejudice); Castonguay v. Houston, 4:13CV3094, Filing No. 9 (dismissing petition without prejudice to reassertion of a subsequent petition upon authorization by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals).)

The pending petition is a second or successive petition under the statute because it challenges the same judgment already challenged in this court. Moreover, the petition does not fit any of the recognized exceptions to the bar on second or successive petitions. The record does not reflect that Castonguay has received permission from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to again attack this conviction. If he wishes to continue to pursue this matter, he should file a motion with the Eighth ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.