United States District Court, D. Nebraska
MICHALE M. DIXON, Petitioner,
DENISE SKROBECKI, Warden, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOSEPH F. BATAILLON, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Michale Dixon's ("Petitioner" or "Dixon") Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Filing No. 10.) For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss three of Dixon's claims and order additional briefing on one claim.
Liberally construed, Dixon argues she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus based on the following claims:
Claim One: Petitioner was denied the constitutional right to retain counsel of her own choosing.
Claim Two: Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because trial counsel did not file an interlocutory appeal asserting Petitioner's right to retain counsel of her choosing, or advise Petitioner
Claim Three: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the state district court proceeded to sentencing immediately after the plea hearing.
Claim Four: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the state district court sentenced her as a habitual criminal.
(Filing No. 11 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.)
A. Conviction and Sentence
Dixon's conviction and sentence arise out of the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska ("state district court"). The following facts, set forth by the Nebraska Supreme Court, are relevant to Dixon's habeas corpus claims:
On April 9, 2012, Dixon was charged with the unauthorized use of a financial transaction device with a value between $500 and $1, 500, and with another offense in a separate case.... The public defender's office was appointed to represent Dixon on both sets of Dixon's offenses, because she was found to be indigent.
On June 28, 2012, the public defender and the prosecutor assigned to this case appeared before the district court, with Dixon present, and informed the court that they both had been contacted repeatedly by attorney Frank Robak, Sr., about the case. The public defender and the prosecutor informed the court that Robak had been paid a retainer fee by Dixon's fiance to represent Dixon, but had not entered a formal appearance in the case. Dixon reported to the public defender that she had paid Robak enough money for him to enter a plea on Dixon's behalf, but that Robak was requesting more money to proceed with a jury trial. The public defender further explained that Dixon had requested a continuance in the case so that Dixon could gather the funds necessary to retain Robak and proceed with trial. The prosecutor informed the court that she had no objection to the continuance of the matter so that Dixon could obtain funds to retain Robak for representation.
The court allowed for the continuance, and Dixon waived all of her rights to a speedy trial on the record. The court further explained to Dixon that because Robak had never entered an appearance in the case, he was not currently representing Dixon and that the public defender was her current counsel. A status hearing was scheduled for July 24, 2012, for the parties to inform the court as to whether Dixon was able to retain Robak.
On July 18, 2012, Robak filed a "Limited Appearance of Counsel" on behalf of Dixon for the "limited purpose of attempting immediate resolution of this case without necessity of a trial or complex hearings." A week after this filing, on July 24, the court conducted the scheduled status hearing with the public defender and the prosecutor present. Robak was not present at the hearing. The court reported on the record that Robak confirmed with the court and the various parties in chambers the week prior that he would not be representing Dixon and that he would be withdrawing his limited appearance. The court further noted that pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.2(d) (rev. 2008), a limited appearance may be entered by a lawyer only when a party is not represented and that it considered Robak's limited appearance a "nullity, " regardless of whether Robak was going to withdraw it. The court then made a docket entry reflecting this finding.
On July 30, 2012, the public defender and the prosecutor appeared before the district court again, with Dixon present, to address Robak's continued contact with Dixon. According to Dixon's public defender, Robak continued to communicate with Dixon regarding the case. The public defender reported Robak had instructed Dixon to inform the court that Dixon supported his limited appearance and that the court should take notice of this. The court refused to take such notice, again noting that "a person may enter a limited appearance for a person who is not represented" and that "Dixon is represented." The court further instructed Dixon that Robak had to fully represent her or not represent her at all. The court explained to Dixon that Robak had previously told the court in chambers prior to the July 24 status hearing that he would represent Dixon in seeking a plea, but not if the case went to trial. However, there was no plea offer before the court. Thus, the court found Robak was not representing Dixon. Dixon's case was then placed on the court's trial list for the September term.
On August 1, 2012, the court sent a letter to Robak, with copies to the prosecutor and the public defender. The letter stated that the court understood that Robak was going to withdraw his limited appearance, as he had indicated at the July 18 in-chambers meeting, but that he had failed to do so. The letter further reported that the Nebraska rules on limited representation do not permit a lawyer to enter a limited appearance on behalf of a person who is represented by counsel. The letter contained a copy of § 3-501.2(d) and explained that the public defender was Dixon's current attorney unless the court specifically gave the public defender permission to withdraw from the case.
On August 30, 2012, Dixon pled no contest to the unauthorized use of a financial device with a value between $500 and $1, 500. The court found that Dixon understood her rights and the consequences of waiving those rights and that Dixon's waiver was freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court accepted Dixon's plea. In exchange for Dixon's plea of no contest, the offense charged in Dixon's other case was dismissed. Dixon then reported to the court that she was satisfied with the job the public defender had done in this matter. After the court accepted Dixon's plea, it asked Dixon if she wanted to be sentenced that day. Dixon answered affirmatively and confirmed she had discussed this with counsel.
An enhancement hearing was then held, and the prosecution entered five exhibits into evidence relating to Dixon's various prior convictions.... Dixon objected to the admittance of the exhibits[.]... The court found all of Dixon's objections to be collateral attacks on the earlier judgments. The court then found Dixon to be a habitual ...