United States District Court, D. Nebraska
EDDIE E. ABRAM, Plaintiff,
McKILLIP, Cpl., Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOSEPH F. BATAILLON, Senior District Judge.
This matter represents one of 18 cases filed by Plaintiff Eddie Abram on May 22, 2014, concerning prison conditions at Tecumseh State Correctional Institution ("TSCI") in Tecumseh, Nebraska. This court has given Abram leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter. (Filing No. 8.) The court now conducts an initial review of Abram's Complaint (Filing No. 1) to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Abram is incarcerated at the Lincoln Correctional Center in Lincoln, Nebraska. However, he was incarcerated at TSCI when he filed this action. He named TSCI guard Corporal McKillip as a defendant in this matter.
Abram alleged that on November 28, 2013, Abram was outside in the yard at TSCI. While outside, Abram "was having chest pains, [his] medication was messing with [him] and [he] was cold." (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.) Abram asked to go back inside, but McKillip refused to let him inside and called him "a piece of shit." Abram alleged in his Complaint that McKillip was "unprofessional, rude and out of line." (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 5.) As relief, Abram seeks money damages in the amount of $10, 000. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 6.)
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, " or "their complaint must be dismissed" for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff's complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff's allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against a state, state instrumentalities and an employee of a state sued in the employee's official capacity. See, e.g., Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1995). Any award of retroactive monetary relief payable by the state, including for back pay or damages, is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of immunity by the state or an override of immunity by Congress. See, e.g., Id.; Nevels v. Hanlon, 656 F.2d 372, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1981). Sovereign immunity does not bar damages claims against state officials acting in their personal capacities, nor does it bar claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that seek equitable relief from state employee defendants acting in their official capacity.
Abram has sued a state employee and seeks only monetary relief. To the extent he seeks to sue McKillip in his official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against employees of a state sued in their official capacities.
In addition, Abram has not stated a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted. He alleged that McKillip called him a "piece of shit." However, name calling by a prison guard is not a constitutional violation cognizable under section 1983. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Franks v. Fridley, No. 13-0561-WS-N, 2014 WL 3540574, at *5 (S.D. Al. July 17, 2014) ("Inappropriate, derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening or abusive comments made by a correctional official to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or unprofessional, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.") (collecting cases).
Abram also alleged that McKillip refused to let him back inside from "yard." Conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment where those conditions result in a serious deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" under contemporary standards of decency. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the prison conditions pose a substantial risk of harm; and (2) that the prison official ...